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BECOMING “INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION”
Nancy A. Welsh and Andrea K. Schneider *
While the current system of investment treaty arbitration has definitely improved
upon the “gunboat diplomacy” used at times to address disputes between states and
foreign investors, there are signs that reform is needed. Increasingly, states and
investors express concerns regarding the costs associated with the arbitration process;
some states are refusing to comply with arbitral awards; other states now hesitate to
sign new bilateral investment treaties; and citizens have begun to engage in popular
unrest at the prospect of investment treaty arbitration. As a result, both investors
and states are advocating for the use of mediation to supplement investor-state
arbitration.
INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, there has been a noticeable surge in the number of
investors accessing investment treaty arbitration. 1 Perhaps as a result of this
phenomenon, coupled with the heavy costs of investment treaty arbitration and the
size of some arbitral awards, both states and investors are now raising multiple
concerns. The parties decry the expense, delays, and political challenges associated
with relying exclusively on a rights-based arbitral process.2 Most seriously, the current
investment arbitration system is viable only if states voluntarily comply with, and
enforce, the arbitral awards produced by the system—and such compliance cannot be
presumed when the awards are adverse to nations’ interests. Indeed, some states have
* Nancy A. Welsh is the William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State
University, Dickinson School of Law. Andrea Schneider is a Professor of Law and Director,
Marquette University Law School.
1 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload Statistics
(2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then
follow “ICSID Publications” hyperlink; then follow “The ICSID Caseload - Statistics” hyperlink)
(indicating that 39% of ICSID’s arbitration and conciliation proceedings that concluded in the first half
of 2011 were settled or otherwise discontinued); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There A Better Way?
Alternative Methods of Treaty Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 168 (2007)
(describing how “initiation of an arbitration may both favor and discourage negotiated settlements).
2 See Tom Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2010); THE
COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(J. Gaitis, C. von Kann, R. Wachsmuth eds., 2d ed. 2010); Salacuse, supra note 1.
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begun to threaten to refuse to abide by arbitral awards.3 Such threats are not new, or
even unique to international arbitration. In the U.S., the famous case of Marbury v.
Madison4 involved a freshly-minted Supreme Court similarly struggling to establish its
legal and political authority while also acknowledging its dependence on the
enforcement power wielded by the executive branch of government. Despite the
familiarity of the dynamic, however, the seriousness of states’ threats to refuse to
comply with awards is very real. If unchecked, such threats have the potential to
introduce a level of uncertainty that could cause serious retraction in international
investment and trade.
The current investor-state arbitration process tends to focus the parties on
their legal rights—and the need to resolve ambiguities regarding such legal rights5—
when the parties’ extra-legal interests may be even more important and helpful in
fashioning a resolution. 6 Indeed, some commentators fear that arbitration may
marginalize the parties’ helpful socio-cultural characteristics and mutual interests that
have the potential to sustain a currently-troubled business relationship. As Jeswald
Salacuse notes, “[n]either the aim nor the consequence of arbitration is to repair a
broken business relationship.” 7 Particularly noteworthy have been the comments
made by Grant Kesler, the Chief Executive Officer of Metalclad, after his company
won a 17 million dollar arbitral award against Mexico. In retrospect, and despite
being victorious, Kesler said that arbitration had been so dissatisfying that he wished
his company had relied upon its “political options” to resolve the dispute.8 These
comments suggest that losing parties, and some of those who have won, may seek a
process with fewer transaction costs that allows them to focus a greater percentage of

3
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Series on
International Investment Policies for Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to
Arbitration, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11 (Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Investor-State
Disputes], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf; Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007) (surveying
empirical research regarding investment arbitration). See also United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims, IIA Issues
Note (Dec. 2010) (describing withdrawal of Bolivia and Ecuador from ICSID and Ecuador’s
termination
of
several
bilateral
investment
treaties),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf.
4 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
5 See Mark A. Clodfelter, Why Aren’t More Investor-State Treaty Disputes Settled Amicably?, in
Mandatory Mediation and Its Variations and Dispute System Design in Investor-State Arbitration, in INVESTORSTATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION II, 38-42 (Susan Franck and
Anna Joubin-Bret, eds., 2011) [hereinafter INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II] (citing to legal questions
regarding the arbitrability of disputes arising under most-favored-nation clauses, the types of activities
that qualify as investments, and the elements of claims for violation of the fair and equitable treatment
standard or the national treatment standard).
6 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and Religious
Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747 (2010) (suggesting that mediation is most appropriate to craft customized
implementation of judicially-determined legal entitlements).
7 Salacuse, supra note 1, at 155.
8 See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 161, n. 266 (2007) [hereinafter Integrating Investment Treaty]; see Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward A
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 7, 8-9 (2005); Salacuse, supra note 1, at 147.
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their resources on problem-solving and the development of satisfactory solutions
rather than formalized, principled fighting.
Responding to these concerns, Professors Jack Coe,9 Jeswald Salacuse,10 and
Susan Franck11 have urged consideration of procedures and systems that could reduce
the likelihood that investor-state disputes will arise, or once they have arisen, could
channel such disputes into forums that encourage communication and the
development of consensual solutions. Such forums include mandatory negotiation,
conciliation, early neutral evaluation, ombudspersons, and mediation. Some states
have begun to put such procedures into place, generally focusing on those that require
communication before the submission of a dispute to arbitration and thus fostering
early information exchange and negotiation. 12 Investors, states, and interested
international bodies and scholars have also begun to develop rules to encourage the
use of mediation.13 Some stakeholders have even proposed that mediation should not
just be encouraged but made mandatory, at least to some degree.14
Importantly, not all stakeholders embrace these developments. Some
stakeholders have criticized the mediation process as unnecessary at best and, at
worst, a threat to the useful work being done by arbitration.15 Some commentators
have suggested that mediation simply cannot be exported into the investment treaty
context, with its unique political and legal issues.16 Further, these commentators urge
that if the sophisticated parties involved in investor-state disputes cannot reach
resolution on their own, mediation will not be able to produce it.17
Once again, this dynamic is not new. A couple of decades ago, when
mediation proponents first urged the integration of mediation into civil litigation,
many judges and litigators resisted the call. They confused “mediation” with
“meditation” and therapy, labeled mediation a “fad,” and insisted that it was an
unprincipled, emotion-laden process. Some of these criticisms persist. Interestingly,
See Coe, supra note 8.
See Salacuse, supra note 1.
11 See Integrating Investment Treaty, supra note 8.
12 See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 3, at 49, 68.
13 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II, supra note 5; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, MEDIATION
9

10

COMMITTEE, STATE MEDIATION SUBCOMMITTEE, IBA RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION (ANN JOUBINBRET
&
BARTON
LEGUM,
CO-CHAIRS)
available
at

http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Mediation/Default.aspx.
14 See id.; see also Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice
System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117 (2004); see Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before
You Leap and Keep On Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J.
399 (2005).
15
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, W. Michael Reisman, International
Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, in Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration II, 22-7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/ IA/2010/8 (Mar. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf.; see generally, Coe, supra note 8, at
17-18 (describing the weaknesses of conciliation that arise out of its dependence upon the parties’
voluntary and good faith use of the process).
16 See Lucy Reed, Synopsis of Closing Remarks, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II, supra note 5, at
30-2.
17 But see Salacuse, supra note 1, at 166 (estimates of negotiated settlements in ICSID run as
high as 30%); see also Coe, supra note 8.
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these critics have been joined by others who suggest that mediation represents
nothing more than the unprincipled bargaining of the marketplace.
At this time, however, mediation is an integral part of civil litigation in federal
and state courts in the U.S. Mediation settles many cases, and parties generally
perceive it to be as fair and satisfactory as adjudicative processes. One of the authors
of this Essay has urged that mediation is likely to be able to offer greater procedural
fairness than lawyers’ bilateral negotiations. Business leaders express a preference for
mediation, in comparison to either arbitration or litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, meanwhile, are filled with directives requiring lawyers to negotiate with
each other before approaching the court with requests for assistance in resolving
litigation-related disputes. Though these provisions do not necessarily invoke
mediation, they evidence the courts’ embrace of consensual processes, like mediation,
as a condition precedent or valuable supplement to adjudicative procedures.
The story of the evolution of court-connected mediation in the U.S. has been
told elsewhere. But the current framing of the mediation debate in the investor-state
context, including the discussion of mediation’s potential value, suffers from a lack of
understanding regarding the variety of structures, goals and interventions that can
characterize the process—and the need, therefore, to be explicit about the structure,
goals and interventions most appropriate in the investor-state context. Such lack of
understanding is entirely understandable. The term “mediation” is used quite loosely
to describe a wide variety of practices. Such inconsistency can be frustrating and
confusing. But, once again, this dynamic is not new. The practices that characterize
“mediation” vary in the same way that the practices of “courts” and “lawyers” and
“arbitrators” vary from state to state, and even from context to context.
Rather than relying on the label of “mediation,” therefore, states need to be
certain they are clear regarding the goals and essential practices that should
characterize investor-state mediation in their investment treaties. Similarly, the
investors that are urging states to use mediation and participating in the development
of rules to implement the process need to be transparent regarding their goals for the
process. Mediation providers and individual mediators, meanwhile, should be ready
to educate states and investors regarding their mediation options, how these options
vary, why the variations matter, and how mediation can be customized to make it
responsive to parties’ needs. This Essay is meant to ease the beginning of a
thoughtful and deliberative process involving all of the actors just referenced, by
highlighting the “broad-brush” distinctions between arbitration and mediation, and
then noting the permeability of those distinctions due to the different models of
arbitration and mediation that exist. Ultimately, through their choices, the leading
actors in the investment treaty context will be instrumental in developing the process
that is “becoming investor-state mediation.”
I. DISTINGUISHING MEDIATION FROM ARBITRATION
It is a truism that mediation and arbitration are different. Mediation is
presumptively interest-based. Arbitration is presumptively rights-based. Mediation is
focused on facilitating the parties’ communication, negotiation and decision-making.
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Arbitration is focused on enabling the arbitrator’s decision-making. Mediation looks
like a meeting. Arbitration looks like a hearing.
But closer examination reveals that mediation is clearly different from
arbitration in only one key respect––the neutral’s degree of control over the
outcome. 18 In mediation, the neutral (or mediator) assists the parties with their
communications and negotiation. She cannot impose a solution. If there is a binding
resolution reached in mediation, it will be the result of the parties’ voluntary
agreement.19 In contrast, at least in binding arbitration, decision-making power vests in
arbitrators alone. They have the authority to decide outcomes for parties and issue
binding awards. Indeed, in the U.S. domestic context, arbitral awards often appear
more binding than those issued by many courts. And, in the international context,
there is no question that arbitration awards are easier to enforce than court judgments
or negotiated agreements.20
In common law countries, meanwhile, arbitration tends to have a different
“look” than mediation. Arbitration mimics a formal judicial hearing. The process can
feature opening statements, direct and cross examination of witnesses, determinations
regarding the admissibility of documents into evidence, and even closing arguments.
While the arbitrators may interrupt the parties’ presentations to ask questions, the
parties present their cases in sequential order. If lawyers are involved, the parties tend
to testify only in response to the lawyers’ or the arbitrators’ questions. The process is
structured to ensure that the arbitrator has the information needed to make her
decision, which will be binding upon the parties.21
In contrast, mediation in common law countries is a much less-obviously
structured affair. The process often, but not always, begins with pre-mediation
submissions and telephonic conferences with the mediator. On the day of the
mediation, the parties meet in a conference room; the process generally begins with
an orientation by the mediator and opening statements by each side. The mediators
and parties may then stay together throughout the process or separate into different
rooms, with the mediator “shuttling” among them. If the parties have separated and
reach resolution, they may reconvene for a joint meeting to confirm the terms of the
settlement. The process is structured to ensure that the parties have the information
they need to allow them to reach a decision that they can accept and will implement.

See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures:
An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008).
19 Of course, case law suggests that this ideal is not always met. See Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Court-Annexed Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 17–19 (2001) [hereinafter Thinning Vision]; see also Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in
Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002); James R.
Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006).
20 But see Edna Sussman, The New York Convention Through a Mediation Prism, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Summer 2009 (referencing other nations’ approaches for enforcing judicially-brokered
agreements).
21 See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009).
18
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It is easy, however, to overstate these differences between mediation and
arbitration. When “mediation” is the name that has been given to parties’ meetings
with judges or to disputants’ meetings with village or community elders, conceptual
distinctions between mediation and arbitration may be quite difficult to discern.
Similarly, when judicial hearings look more like meetings—as they do in civil law and
inquisitorial systems—the arbitration procedures modeled after this model of civil
litigation may be quite difficult to differentiate from mediation in terms of outcome
control, formality, and procedural structure. And even in the U.S., which has a
common law tradition, lawyers and parties often are willing to grant substantial
deference to a mediator’s reactions and opinions. This is likely to be especially true if
the lawyers and parties have selected the mediator for his substantive knowledge,
relevant mediation experience, status, facility in managing the process, perceived
even-handedness, and general temperament. In other words, even in common law
countries, a mediator may represent a “respected elder” within the relevant legal and
business communities 22 —and though the mediator does not have the authority to
impose a solution, his assessments and suggestions have the potential to be extremely
influential.23
Finally, as noted supra, mediation is generally described as an interest-based
process while arbitration is described as rights-based. Reality, however, presents a
more nuanced picture. First, in some industry contexts, arbitration can be explicitly
interest-based rather than rights-based.24 Second, different models of mediation vary
substantially in the intensity of their focus on interests. This Essay turns next to these
mediation variations.
II. THE CONFOUND OF MEDIATION VARIATIONS
The strength of the distinction between arbitration and mediation in terms of
their focus is likely to depend upon the geographic and industry context, the
mediators who tend to be used in that context, and the particular model of mediation
that these mediators use. 25 Mediation certainly offers the opportunity for explicit
22 Christopher Honeyman & Sandra Cheldelin, Have Gavel Will Travel: Dispute Resolution’s
Innocents Abroad, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 363 (2002); see also Salacuse, supra note 1.
23 See Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of Successful (and Unsuccessful)
Mediators, 8 DISP. RESOL. ALERT 1 (2008); Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of
Successful (and Unsuccessful) Mediators Continued: Studies Two and Three, 23 NEGOT, J. 393 (2007); Leonard L.
Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is? 'The Problem' in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 863, 874 (2008) [hereinafter Court-Oriented Mediation] (citing research studies showing that
lawyers prefer mediators who are litigators with relevant substantive expertise who will provide their
opinions regarding the merits of the parties’ cases as well as a suggested settlement range and that cases
are significantly more likely to settle in mediation if the parties select their own mediator).
24 “Interest arbitration” is used in the labor context. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID
G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 264-265 (3d ed. 2001); CARRIE J.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 400-401 (2d
ed. 2011);
25 Other scholars have used different taxonomies to distinguish among different mediator
behaviors. See e.g., Salacuse, supra note 1, at 160 (distinguishing the following “basic areas that
mediators seek to address in their efforts to facilitate a negotiated agreement between the parties: a)
process, b) communications, and c) substance); Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There
Method in the Madness of Mediation?: Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, in
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consideration of the parties’ extra-legal interests. Indeed, some courts in the U.S.
describe mediation as follows:
Mediation is a process in which parties and counsel agree to meet with
a neutral mediator trained to assist them in settling disputes. The
mediator improves communication across party lines, helps parties
articulate their interests and understand those of the other party,
probes the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s legal positions,
and identifies areas of agreement and helps generate options for a
mutually agreeable resolution to the dispute. In all cases, mediation
provides an opportunity to explore a wide range of potential solutions
and to address interests that may be outside the scope of the stated
controversy or which could not be addressed by judicial action. A
hallmark of mediation is its capacity to expand traditional settlement
discussions and broaden resolution options, often by exploring litigant
needs and interests that may be formally independent of the legal
issues in controversy.26
In some models of mediation, therefore, the mediator focuses primarily on
drawing out the disputing parties and understanding their values and underlying
interests, helping them to communicate fully, respectfully, and productively with each
other, asking them questions to help them be thoughtful, and fostering their ability to
develop their own customized and interest-based solutions.27 These models tend to
be called “facilitative,” “elicitive,” “understanding-focused,” “therapeutic,”
“humanistic,” “narrative,” “insightful,” “transformative” and focus on facilitating the
development of understanding and “integrative [or interest-based] solutions.” 28
Public policy facilitation and other public dialogue processes also tend to fit in this
category. 29 Such models encourage the parties to play a central role if they wish,
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS 19, 36-37 (Jacob
Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, eds., 2009) (identifying “three fundamental mediator strategies
along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention. . . (a) communication-facilitation; (b)
procedural strategies; and (c) directive strategies” and reporting that international mediators, with
significant resources and high status and using directive strategies, are most likely to achieve
settlements in high-intensity disputes, while regional mediators, with cultural similarity and using
procedural strategies, are most likely to achieve settlements in low-intensity conflicts); Goldberg &
Shaw, supra note 23; Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Meta Model: Understanding Practice Around the World,
26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 97 (2008) (proposing the following categories of mediation: settlement
mediation, facilitative mediation, transformative mediation, expert advisory mediation, wise counsel
mediation, and tradition-based mediation); John Wood, Mediation Styles: Subjective Description of Mediators,
21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 437 (2004) (describing various styles as counselor, negotiator, facilitator and
democrat).
26 S.D.N.Y. & N.D.N.Y. C.P.L.R. 83.8 (applying exclusively to the Southern District).
27 Court-Oriented Mediation, supra note 23; Thinning Vision, supra note 19.
28 See, e.g.,. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 24. See also LEONARD L. RISKIN
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009).
29 See also Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, Searching for a Sense of Control: The Challenge Presented
By Community Conflicts Over Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295
(2002). See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal
Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 290 (2009) (explaining that processes for
resolving conflict in policy-making vary along several dimensions, including the participants, their
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though they also may choose to defer to their lawyers. Not surprisingly, these models
tend to value communication among the parties, reflective listening, and the use of
joint sessions for as long as they are productive.
Particularly in complex matters, whether they are commercial, environmental,
or court-connected, mediators using these models are likely to engage in substantial
“pre-mediation” work. They are likely to review legal documents, require premediation submissions from the parties, and confer with the lawyers (and even the
parties) beforehand to learn about the dynamics of the dispute and the interests of the
parties that will be relevant in customizing the process.30 In some matters, such as
disputes over land development or environmental issues, mediators may even help the
parties determine other non-party stakeholders who should somehow be involved in
the mediation due to the significance of their interests, their ability to offer helpful
expertise or resources for resolution, or their potential to scuttle any deals that are
reached. Mediators using these models may also use caucuses (or ex parte meetings)
primarily to supplement or assist the productivity of parties’ joint negotiations. In
such caucuses, the mediators may provide parties with the opportunity to “cool off”
or express themselves on sensitive topics, offer an empathetic ear, help parties
consider how they can participate or negotiate more effectively in the joint session,
encourage parties to discuss the weaknesses of their position, or help parties consider
the consequences of the solution that appears to be the most likely candidate for
settlement.
Joint sessions also remain important to facilitate the parties’
communication and negotiation.
There are also mediation models that are described as “evaluative,”
“directive,” and focused on facilitating distributive outcomes. Again, mediators are
likely to engage in substantial pre-mediation work. In this second set of models,
though, the mediators and lawyers play the central roles, and the focus is usually on
law-related issues.31 The understanding of who should be involved in the mediation is
likely to be limited by the lawyers’ perceptual map, 32 thus tending to exclude
stakeholders who do not have legally-cognizable interests or legal standing. Initial
presentations by the lawyers are likely to focus on legal issues, followed by legal and
litigation-oriented analysis and the mediator’s provision of indirect or direct advice to
the parties and their lawyers to help them be realistic regarding their options in civil
litigation or administrative adjudication and to guide them toward a resolution
generally consistent with those options. Notice that the focus of, and remedy
authority and power to influence policy decisions, and the process for communication and decisionmaking). See also THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING
AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al., eds., 1999). BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 225 (2000).
30 See Court-Oriented Mediation, supra note 23; ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TASK
FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY: FINAL REPORT APRIL 2006 - FEBRUARY 2008 (2008)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT APRIL 2006 - FEBRUARY 2008]; GARY FRIEDMAN AND JACK
HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2009).
31 Note, though, that this issue orientation is not inevitable.
See Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 7 (1996); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003-2004); Court-Oriented Mediation, supra note 23.
32 See id.
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produced by, this set of models of mediation begins to sound much like what is
applicable to conciliation or even non-binding arbitration.33
Despite mediation’s reputation for a preoccupation with parties’ interests,
much non-family court-connected mediation in the U.S. actually focuses primarily on
legal and litigation analysis. There likely are multiple reasons for this: the mediation
is occurring in the shadow of the courthouse; the lawyers generally select the
mediators; the mediators tend to be lawyers themselves, with relevant substantive
expertise; the lawyers tend to dominate the discussion in mediation; the parties may
be unable or unwilling to engage in the sort of disclosure and discussion likely to lead
to integrative solutions;34 and the parties may prefer to focus on the law as a means to
reach resolution.35
Interestingly, though, there are indications that sophisticated mediation users
prefer mediators and mediation sessions that can uncover and use the parties’ extralegal interests as well as engage the lawyers and parties in a discussion of the relevant
law and litigation realities. Mediation has the capacity to house both functions,
without one dominating or marginalizing the other. Available research in the U.S.
generally suggests that the most effective court-connected mediators are those who
can combine elements of all of the mediation models described supra, with mediators
thoroughly preparing themselves and facilitating the preparation of the disputants and
their lawyers, seeking to understand important interests and develop trust, listening
carefully and effectively, asking parties to explore or justify their assumptions and
predictions regarding legal outcomes, carefully challenging unrealistic assumptions
and helping parties to be more realistic, offering face-saving strategies, and assisting
disputants and lawyers to develop responsive, realistic solutions.36 In other words, the
presumptively interest-based process of mediation is most likely to be helpful when it
includes both legal analysis and probing for interests. Note, however, that the process
still presumes that no agreement will occur without the parties’ voluntary assent.
Note further that this inclusive model of mediation requires both clear differentiation
from other available processes, and legal and procedural protection of the time
commitment required for its operation.37
See Salacuse, supra note 1 (equating conciliation and non-binding arbitration). Sometimes,
the definition of conciliation seems as contested as that of mediation. See Coe, supra note 8; CHRISTIAN
BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 273 (1st ed.
1996).
34
See Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from
the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427 (2009)
[hereinafter You’ve Got].
35 See id. (describing why so much mediation is focused on analysis of law and litigation);
Thinning Vision, supra note 19; Robert Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for
Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 55 (2002).
36 See Court-Oriented Mediation, supra note 23; Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking
Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 573 (2004) [hereinafter Stepping Back]; FINAL REPORT APRIL 2006 - FEBRUARY 2008,
supra note 30, at 12-13, 17; Kenneth Kressel, The Strategic Style in Mediation, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 251
(2007); Cheryl Picard, Exploring Integrative Framework for Understanding Mediation 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q.
295 (2004) (arguing for a vision of mediation that integrates various theories).
37 See You’ve Got, supra note 34 (calling for mediation to be accompanied by other processes,
in order to permit mediation to operate as an inclusive process).
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In the investment treaty context, it will presumably be important for the
parties to maintain or improve ongoing relationships, collaborate on the
implementation of any agreement, and acknowledge volatile political situations to
enable representatives (and their constituencies) to embrace effective solutions, even
if they are not the preferred solutions. All of these factors suggest the value of the
last model of mediation described supra, one that is presumptively-facilitative and
preceded by careful preparation, but supplemented as necessary with more evaluative
interventions, and involving the consideration of both legal issues and extra-legal
interests. Such a process might facilitate the parties’ “mutual consideration”38 of each
other’s perspectives and underlying needs as well as their legal analysis. In other
words, it will be important for the mediator to offer a procedurally just process and to
facilitate the parties’ ability to engage in a procedurally just process with each other.
Investors and states will need sufficient opportunity to speak and be heard, but also to
listen to each other, reflect upon what was said, demonstrate that they have listened to
each other—and also make meaningful movement toward resolution.39
It is essential, though, to consider mediation in context, and this requires a
brief discussion of the other procedures available to investors and states. Generally,
three such procedures come to mind—negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration. The
mediation model described supra offers something new in comparison to these
procedures—a third party’s assistance in facilitating the parties’ communication,
information-sharing and negotiation and an explicit opportunity to identify and focus
on the discussion of interests. A few states, however, have expanded the usual list of
options available in the investor-state context by establishing new structures and
procedures designed to encourage early communication and information-sharing
between states and investors, thus identifying difficulties before they escalate into
disputes or resolving such disputes very early on. Examples include Peru’s
coordination and response system, including its Special Commission; China’s
domestic administrative review process; and Colombia’s establishment of a lead
agency model.40 Interestingly, the state officials leading these efforts have the potential
to serve a “quasi-mediator” function, meeting many of the needs that would
otherwise fall to third party mediators using the model of mediation described supra.
Trust, however, is the key. If investors perceive these quasi-mediators as biased
against them—as insufficiently benevolent, insufficiently even-handed, or
insufficiently open-minded—then investors are unlikely to perceive their procedures
as fair.41 Mediation involving an outside mediator is likely to be perceived as more
procedurally just—or fairer--and thus preferable. At the very least, then, the easy
availability of a corps of outside, independent and trusted mediators, as an alternative
to the state’s judicial or administrative officials, has the potential to incentivize the
state to make its own processes equally even-handed, in order to attract foreign
investors.
Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 36.
See id.; but see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381 (2010).
40 See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 3, at 49, 68.
41 See Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 395 (2010).
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III. CONCLUSION
A procedure called “mediation” is likely to be useful in the investor-state
context, but mediation’s value will depend upon the particular model that is
integrated, and whether it responds to the parties’ needs and complements the other
available processes in this dispute resolution system. Thus, key actors must devote
some time and attention to identifying the key goals and essential practices that
should characterize the process that “becomes investor-state mediation.” Once the
desired goals and essential practices are identified, much more work remains to be
done—e.g., developing relevant rules and supportive organizational structures,
identifying an appropriate pool of mediators, etc. Being clear regarding the goal,
however, is the first step.
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